Stockholders\u27 Derivative Suit May be Brought Against Multinational Corporation for its Failure to Sue to Recover Illicit Payments to Foreign Officials, Where it is Shown that such Decision was Based on Collusion, Self-interest, Dishonesty or Lack of Good Faith: Gall v. Exxon Corp. by Hooper, Lawrence
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 12
Stockholders' Derivative Suit May be Brought
Against Multinational Corporation for its Failure to
Sue to Recover Illicit Payments to Foreign Officials,
Where it is Shown that such Decision was Based
on Collusion, Self-interest, Dishonesty or Lack of
Good Faith: Gall v. Exxon Corp.
Lawrence Hooper
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Hooper, Stockholders' Derivative Suit May be Brought Against Multinational Corporation for its Failure to Sue to Recover Illicit
Payments to Foreign Officials, Where it is Shown that such Decision was Based on Collusion, Self-interest, Dishonesty or Lack of Good Faith:
Gall v. Exxon Corp. , 2 Md. J. Int'l L. 247 (1977).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol2/iss2/12
TopIcAL SURVEY
II. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
B. Multinational Enterprises and Problems
of Doing Business Abroad
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT MAY BE BROUGHT
AGAINST MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION FOR ITS
FAILURE TO SUE TO RECOVER ILLICIT PAYMENTS
TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS, WHERE IT IS SHOWN THAT
SUCH DECISION WAS BASED ON COLLUSION, SELF-
INTEREST, DISHONESTY OR LACK OF GOOD FAITH.
Gall v. Exxon Corporation, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
In a stockholder's derivative action brought in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
plaintiff sued Exxon Corporation and a number of its present
and former directors and officers. The suit charged the defend-
ants with violations of Sections 13(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933,1 Section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2
and breaches of their fiduciary responsibilities to Exxon. These
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
1. Securities Act of 1933, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
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charges were made in connection with the payment of approxi-
mately $59 million by Exxon officials during the years 1963
through 1972.
Vincenzo Cazzaniga, the President and Managing Director
of Esso Italiana, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Corpora-
tion was involved in the contested payments. Cazzaniga made
unauthorized payments to an Italian gas pipeline company and
to various Italian political parties from secret bank accounts
maintained separately from Esso Italiana's funds. The contribu-
tions to the political parties during the period in question
amounted to $27.9 million. Apparently, both Exxon's general
counsel and Italian counsel informed the corporation's directors
that the payments were legal. In 1972 Cazzaniga requested funds
to aid in the settlement of a current pending lawsuit against Esso
Italiana. Despite the apparent impropriety of such a request,
Exxon directors released the funds in order to honor what was
believed to have been a commitment made by the president of
the Italian subsidiary. This was, allegedly, the last such payment
issued through Cazzaniga.
The court found that the decision whether to assert any
cause of action held by the corporation was clearly vested within
the sound business judgment3 of Exxon's Board of Directors.
The Board, in response to the allegations made by Gall, had
established the Special Committee on Litigation (Committee)
to determine what action the corporation should take.
After extensive investigation the Committee determined that
the contested payments in fact had been made, and that some of
Exxon's directors were aware of these payments. However, the
Committee decided that it was against the corporation's best
interests to sue directors and officers involved. They directed the
appropriate officers to seek dismissal of all shareholder derivative
actions. The defendants moved for a summary judgment dis-
3. The business judgment rule was articulated by J. Brandeis in United Cooper
Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Cooper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917):
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of
action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of
internal management, and is left to the discretion of the directors in the absence
of instruction by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control
such direction intra vires the corporation except where the directors are guilty
of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual
relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment . . .
4. The Committee was vested with the power to act as the Board of Directors
in this matter, pursuant to the by-laws of the corporation.
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missing Gall's complaint, stating the court should respect the
Committee's determination under the "business judgment" rule.
Plaintiff challenged defendants' summary judgment motion
on several grounds. The first ground was that since the payments
involved were illegal, any decision by the Committee regarding
these payments would not fall within the business judgment rule.
In support of this position, Gall primarily relied on Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority5 The court, however, rejected this
argument and distinguished Ashwander from the present case.
It found that no evidence had been placed on the record indicating
that the payments made were illegal either in Italy or the United
States. Although the court deliberately avoided deciding whether
or not such payments were proper, it determined that, even
assuming the payments were illegal, the business judgment rule
would still be applicable. The court concluded that the decision
would be removed from the ambit of the business judgment rule
only if the Committee's decision not to sue was either in violation
of the law or constituted ratification and continuation of the
illegal acts. Neither of these situations was found present in the
case at bar, and the court held that absent allegations of fraud,
collusion, self-interest, dishonesty, or other misconduct in the
nature of a breach of trust, it would not interfere with the judg-
ment of the corporate directors.
Gall also challenged the Committee's decision on the ground
that as the members of the Committee may have been involved
in the payments, they were not sufficiently disinterested from the
action to render an independent and bona fide business judgment.
The court found that no evidence was submitted by Gall to sup-
port this allegation. However, the court also determined that
the defendants did not present sufficient evidence to rebut this
contention. They failed to demonstrate that no genuine issue of
material fact had been raised by the complaint. Therefore, the
court ruled that summary judgment was not appropriate at this
time, and gave the plaintiff sixty days in which to conduct rele-
vant discovery to support her contention. At the end of the sixty
day period the defendants would be allowed to reintroduce their
motion for summary judgment.
It is important to note, however, that a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit may be an appropriate way to challenge a corporation's
determination not to sue if evidence is presented which demon-
5. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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strates fraud, collusion, self-interest, dishonesty, or at a minimum,
absence of good faith on the part of the directors of the corpo-
ration.
In summary, the thrust of this case is that when a corpora-
tion decides not to sue its own officers and directors on charges
of overseas political payments or bribes, because of a determina-
tion made by an independent intramural committee representing
the Board of Directors and exercising good faith and sound busi-
ness judgment, the corporation will not be subject to a derivative
suit by a shareholder.
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